The U.S. is the largest source country of remittances with an outflow of more than $70 billion estimated for 2016 (according to data from the World Bank). This paper is the first to use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to estimate the determinants of remittances originating from the United States for a diverse set of approximately 3,800 households with at least one foreign-born worker. We employ a gravity model examining the role of various push, pull, and distance factors. Most notably, higher household earnings push monetary transfers abroad: We estimate an average earnings elasticity in the range of 0.20-0.30.
Introduction
Since 1970, there have been dramatic increases in remittance outflows originating in the U.S. as data collection processes improved and the costs of transmitting funds abroad decreased.
While there is a vast literature analyzing remittance determinants and motivations, most studies focus on immigrants in the U.S. from a specific country or region (e.g., Mexico or Latin America), or on a specific set of immigrants (e.g., new immigrants). 1 Prior to 2008, there was no federally-sponsored, nationally representative survey in the United States that captured detailed migration and remittance behavior for native and foreign-born households. This paper adds to the literature by being the first (to our knowledge) to use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to estimate the determinants of remittances originating from the United States for a diverse set of households.
In 2008, the CPS administrated a one-time Migration Supplement asking detailed remittance questions such as "In the last 12 months, did anyone in this household give or send money to relatives or friends living outside the U.S.?" This survey also contains details about migration experience and can be linked to other CPS samples so as to incorporate additional characteristics. Our sample includes approximately 3,800 households in the U.S. that had at least one foreign-born, employed, wage-earning, adult not enrolled in school. We use these data in a gravity model of remittances 2 to examine push, pull, and distance factors -including household composition, details of the migration experience, countries of origin, local residence, and macroeconomic factors -that might be associated with monetary transfers originating from the U.S. We pay special attention to estimating the household earnings elasticity of remittances.
This exercise is important for several reasons. Given the magnitude of annual remittance outflows, remittances could significantly impact recipients abroad, particularly in developing countries. Better understanding of remittance motivations and amounts among U.S. house-holds could also improve economists' understanding of the local impacts of migration in the host country. Our use of a dataset covering remittances from a single large country to a wide array of destination countries can help provide more systematic evidence for factors influencing remittance decisions. Finally, policy-makers wishing to facilitate or reduce international remittances might have an interest in better understanding the underlying factors driving those flows.
Our main results are three-fold. First, we estimate an average household earnings elasticity of remittances ranging from about 0.20-0.30. This value is at the lower to middle range of the considerably varied estimates produced by previous literature. Second, the earnings elasticity varies across households: Remittances are much more responsive to earnings as the difference between the number of adult women and men in the household grows. Third, we identify various push, pull, and distance factors that affect the remittance decision. Positive and negative push factors include educational attainment, the presence of a married household member, and the number of women, children, and labor force participants in the U.S. household. Low levels of per capita GDP in the origin county pull remittances away from the U.S. Physical distance plays a role in a household's dichotomous decision of whether or not to remit. The presence of likely-unauthorized immigrants in the household -a signal of cultural distance -increases remittance flows.
2 Related Literature
Theoretical Literature
There are several reasons behind the decision to send remittances abroad, including altruism, self-interest, consumption smoothing, target saving, insurance, and loan repayment. Models of remittance behavior involve a utility-maximizing migrant or household that chooses to send remittances when the net benefits outweigh the costs or when doing so increases expected utility. Therefore, the underlying reason for migrating is to increase one's earnings abroad and to relax the budget constraint for the family members back home.
One of the most widely cited reasons for sending funds is for altruistic reasons with the goal of remaining linked to one's family in the origin country (Stark, 1991) . Altruism in this context is often measured by estimating how remittances respond to the increases in income that occur due to migration. McCracken et al. (2017) develop a simple two-period model of remittance behavior and decompose remittances into altruistic and self-interest components.
Their theoretical model suggests that a higher level of income in the destination country allows for a higher level of remittances. However, a lower level of income in the origin country has ambiguous effects on remittances and depend on whether the altruistic or selfinterest motive dominates. Lower income levels in the origin country will increase the need for remittances if individuals are sufficiently altruistic but will decrease remittances if they are self-interested.
Another popular explanation for remittances is that people will migrate to smooth household consumption and diversify income sources (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989) . As with the altruism model, consumption smoothing models suggest that more funds will be transferred when the economy worsens in the source country. This complements work by Mandelman and Zlate (2012) who find that remittance flows are responsive to business cycles in the source and destination countries. Beti et al. (2008) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) consider if remittances are used as a mechanism to cope with adverse economic shocks across countries.
Some households send migrants abroad to accumulate funds to help pay for a specific investment or large purchase in the source country. Investments can take many forms, from educational or health expenditures to purchasing a new home or land. The migrant usually plans to live and work in the host country temporarily and will return home once the funds have been accumulated. But the outcomes of migration are uncertain in terms of finding a job, earnings, and the possibility of being deported (for undocumented immigrants).
Therefore, remittances may serve as a type of insurance in case the migration experience did not turn out as expected. In addition, migrants may build precautionary savings via remittances. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005, 2006) provide models of insurance and precautionary saving in this context. Remittances will be larger for those facing greater uncertainty in the host country and for recent migrants. Those who have developed deep roots in the receiving country and have not suffered a negative shock upon arrival may be less inclined to send remittances over time. We consider the insurance motive in our analysis by including the number of household members by U.S. entry cohort in our models.
Remittances may also be used to repay loans, particularly those to cover the costs associated with the migration and housing/job search. In the case of illegal border crossings, such costs could include substantial payments to a smuggler or to obtain fake documentation.
Models analyzing migration typically include geographic distance and the legal status of the immigrant to proxy for migration costs.
Remittance decisions are complicated by demographic, geographic, cultural, religious, and economic conditions that vary between the host and source country. Given the complexity of remittance motivations and the diversity of the countries relying upon remittances, the various motives for remitting are not mutually exclusive. A particular migrant will often have a combination of reasons to remit, and motives vary across migrants and over time.
Our analysis below will address many of these factors.
Empirical Literature
A relatively large number of papers empirically estimate remittance determinants, most of which focus on a single migrant group to a single destination country. An obvious point of interest lies in the income (or earnings) elasticity of remittances, but estimates for this value vary tremendously.
Studies using U.S. data often analyze remittances to Latin American countries. For example, Durand et al. (1996) , Sana (2005) and Fairchild and Simpson (2008) use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) in which most respondents are surveyed in Mexico well-after the migration experience. All three studies find a positive relationship between U.S. monthly earnings and remittance levels among household heads. For example, Durand et al. (1996) find that an additional $1,000 of monthly U.S. earnings increases the amount repatriated by nearly 17 percent. Sana (2005) estimates that monthly remittances increase by $5 for a $100 increase in monthly wages. 3 Yang (2011) documents the extent to which remittances represent a substantial fraction of migrants' earnings around the world. There is significant variation across source and destination countries. MMP data reveal that Mexican immigrants to the U.S. surveyed at home after their migration experience report remitting 31 percent of their earnings while they were abroad. Similarly, immigrants from El Salvador remit 37 percent of their earnings.
In contrast, New Immigrant Survey data on newly-admitted immigrants with permanent residence in the U.S. reveals that Indian immigrants remit less than two percent of their income, while new Filipino immigrants remit nearly 6 percent of their earnings.
The remittance literature is not confined to the U.S. experience, of course. Unheim and Rowlands (2012) study recent immigrants in Canada, focusing on the role of demographic characteristics in affecting remittance levels for new immigrants. They find that remittances increase in age, and decrease for those with more educational attainment, larger households, and for married individuals. They also find that remittances increase with household income but at a declining rate. Chowdhury and Das (2016) study the remittance behavior of Chinese and Indian immigrants in Canada using panel data and find a positive relationship between household income and the amount remitted (though income is reported in groupings so elasticities are not estimated). Merkle and Zimmerman (1992) and Sinning (2011) use the German Socioeconomic Panel to analyze the determinants of savings and remittances of foreign-born adults in West Germany. Both studies consider a large set of demographic and socioeconomic factors in sorting out the primary determinants of remittance behavior. Merkle and Zimmerman (1992) find a large, significant, and positive relationship between household monthly income and the amount of transfers sent abroad. In contrast, Sinning (2011) does not find a significant income effect on transfers, but does uncover significant income effects on savings abroad with an estimated elasticity of 0.08.
Evidence from other countries also results in a wide range of estimates for the income elasticity of remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) analysis is more representative than studies exploring a single bilateral flow of funds. We also consider both microeconomic and macroeconomic factors simultaneously.
Estimation Strategy
We analyze the potential determinants of remittance flows using the basic intuition of a gravity model. First, we consider push factors that encourage migrant households to send money abroad. These include resources available to the household and state of residence, as well as demographic features that might be correlated with a household's willingness to financially contribute to the origin country. Second, we consider a limited set of pull factors that might attract remittances back to the home country. Finally, we consider a set of broadly-defined distance features. This includes variables capturing the degree of assimilation for the household and typical gravity model controls.
Although some of our variables do not fit perfectly into a discrete push/pull/distance trichotomy, Table 1 places explanatory variables into these groupings and notes whether the data varies across households, destination states, and/or origin countries. Our examination of the various push, pull, and distance determinants of remittance flows begins with the following specification and variables:
where: -F E k are indicators for whether any household member was born in country k, while F E s represents fixed effects for whether the household is located in U.S. state s.
-u j,k,s is the error term. All regressions cluster standard errors at the state level, but main results hold in regressions that forgo clustering in favor of simple heteroskedasticy-robust standard errors. 6 We seek to estimate effects of push, pull, and distance factors on the proportional size of remittance flows. The obvious approach for doing so would simply measure the dependent variable R j,k,s as the natural log of total household remittances. This presents an estimation problem, however, since approximately 70 percent of our observed households report that they have remitted nothing to their home countries, which implies that many log-remittance values would be undefined. 4 Few households originate from a single country. Two-thirds of the households in our sample include some members born in a foreign country and others born in the U.S., while 11 percent of the remaining observations have members born in multiple foreign countries. Therefore, we account for origin-country economic conditions with a single variable measuring the average GDP of all foreign-born household members' birth countries. 5 Birthplace diversity forces us to use average distance to members' origin countries just as with the average GDP calculation. Country indicators, in contrast, measure whether any member was born in Mexico or Canada. 6 Within-household birthplace diversity prevents clustering at the country level. Moreover, evidence in Abadie et al. (2017) suggests that geographic clustering may be inappropriate in this setting -and might lead to standard errors that are too conservative -since there is no apparent design problem in the data for clustering to correct.
We address this limitation by pursuing four alternative estimation strategies. Our first model measures R j,k,s by adding one dollar to all observations before performing the logtransformation. Though this solution is standard in the literature, it is problematic in that there is little motivation to add one as opposed to some other small value.
Our second strategy adopts a transformation -similarly used in Sinning (2011) and
Clemens and Hunt (2017) -that calculates the inverse hyperbolic sine of remittances. The advantage of this alternative is twofold: It is defined at zero and therefore does not require the addition of an arbitrarily-chosen dollar amount for calculation; and -as with log functions -changes in the inverse hyperbolic sine approximate percentage changes in remittances.
Regression coefficients with this transformation can be interpreted identically to those using the log transformation.
Third, we use a two-part model to better consider how selection into the remittance decision could bias our baseline results. In the first part, we examine the household's dichotomous choice of whether or not to remit anything abroad. In the second part, we estimate the determinants of remittance flows only among households that choose to remit.
Finally, we employ a Heckman model to further address selection concerns. Note that this methodology requires that at least one of the explanatory variables included in the selection model must be excluded from the main model of interest. Motivated by results from the two-part model, we choose the distance variable to fulfill this role since it is a significant predictor of whether or not a household remits but not for how much they remit. 7 As a final note of caution, our sample of interest consists of U.S. households that have at least one foreign-born, employed, wage-earning adult who is not enrolled in school. The results may not be generalizable to other households. Our estimates could, of course, be biased if our covariates are correlated with unobserved factors. For example, our crosssection sample of U.S. households does not include foreign-born individuals who have already returned to their home country since all interviews occur in the U.S. Thus, there may be selection bias in our estimates due to return migration. We cannot account for this possibility.
On the other hand, selection into migration and/or employment should not confound our main results.
Data
The CPS interviewed 54,282 households in the August 2008 CPS Migration Supplement. Of those, 7,560 households had at least one foreign-born member age 18 or older. Households were asked about the amount of money sent to or received from family and friends living outside the United States. We focus on funds that households sent to family and friends abroad and refer to them as remittances. We limit our sample to households who had at least one foreign-born, employed, wage-earning, adult who is not enrolled in school (including those who report zero remittances). We merged the August Supplement to the September-November Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups CPS data in order to record earnings data for all households remaining in the sample. 8 In addition to total annual remittances, our household-level data includes variables measuring household size and composition, the employment status of household members, and other demographic characteristics. We also attach macroeconomic variables to each observation including average per capita GDP of the foreign-born household members' birth countries, GSP of the current state of residence in the U.S., and average distance between birth country and U.S. state of residence. members of each household that are native-born. More than 40 percent of households have at least one member who is likely undocumented, with an average of 0.87 members likely lacking legal status. 9 Table 2 illustrates that there is a fairly uniform distribution of households based on the first year of entry for household members. On average, households have 0.31 members whose first migration experience was in the last 5 years and another 0.33 members whose first experience was more than 30 years ago. Thus, our sample includes many households with recent migration experience in addition to many households with individuals who first migrated to the U.S. decades ago. 9 We follow the approach motivated by Borjas (2017) to define likely undocumented immigrants using CPS data. They include all non-naturalized foreign-born workers that entered the U.S. since 1980, do not work in the military or the government, are not from Cuba, are not a college student, and are not a spouse of a legal resident. 
Results

Baseline results
We use equation 1 to estimate whether various push, pull, and distance factors are associated with the amount of money remitted abroad. The unit of observation is the household.
Regressions are weighted using household weights and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from baseline models. Columns (1)- (2) report results using the natural log of one plus total annual household remittances as the 11 We do not display the comparison of the CPS with the ACS since our analysis is at the household level. Details are available from the authors upon request. dependent variable. Columns (3)-(4) report the results when using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for remittance levels. Even-numbered columns include a full set of destination state and birth country indicators and therefore exclude any state-or countryspecific variables.
As described in section 3, we include a large set of household-level control variables in our regressions. Many of these variables are either dummy variables (e.g., an indicator for households that have at least one married member) or count variables (e.g., the number of household members that are married). Note that the sum of variables capturing the number of immigrants by entry cohort and the number of native-born individuals living in a household equals the household size. This limits what we can do with other collections of count variables. For example, we include the counts of household members by age group in our list of push variables (including one group for people 18 and younger), but we have to omit one reference group (people over age 65) to avoid perfect collinearity. Thus, an increase in the number of youths -holding household size constant -would need to be offset by a decrease in people over the age of 65. It is important to control for these household characteristics, but we must also recognize that the choice of which groups to omit as reference groups is an arbitrary one. Importantly, this choice will not altar the estimates for non-count variables (such as earnings or education). However, it will affect the coefficients (and significance) of remaining count variables. As a result, coefficient interpretation needs to be done carefully since many represent magnitudes relative to a comparison group. In our discussion below, we will be careful to point out when such issues arise.
Push factors
We first consider the impacts of various push factors on the amount remitted. Our primary interest is in the relationship between household weekly earnings in the U.S. and remittances.
We identify positive and significant elasticites with magnitudes that are very similar across specifications. Our results in column (1) indicate an elasticity of approximately 0.288, sug-gesting that a 1 percent increase in household income leads to a 0.288 percent increase in remittances. When we include state and country indicators (in column 2), the elasticity falls only slightly to 0.272. We find similar magnitudes (0.314 and 0.298) when using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in columns 3 and 4.
As noted above, estimates for the income elasticity of remittances exhibit tremendous variation in the literature. Our results are larger than what is reported in Sinning (2011) using German data, but lower than what Arun and Ulku (2011) and Markova and Reilly Several other push variables are significant determinants of remittance flows as well.
We find a negative but relatively small coefficient on the average educational attainment of adults in the household. This finding is consistent with Sana (2005) who suggests that migrants with less education are more likely to prefer belonging to a larger part of the transnational community than those with more education and are therefore more likely to remit. In addition, Unheim and Rowlands (2012) document a negative relationship between education and remittances and suggest that well-educated recent migrants may choose to first focus on establishing themselves in the local community before sending remittances home. However, there is significant debate in the literature about the relationship between educational attainment and remittances (see Niimi et al. 2010 for a summary), and it is also possible for average education to be be correlated with omitted variables -such as household health -that cannot be measured but could play a role in determining remittance amounts.
The gender composition of the household is an important demographic determinant of remittances. An additional female (of any age) in the household -holding household size and other variables constant -lowers the amount remitted by about 18 percent. This negative relationship is consistent with Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) who argue that men remit at higher rates than women since men more frequently leave immediate family in their home countries. Sinning (2011) suggests that immigrant women may be less active in the labor market than foreign-born men and less likely to remit. In Section 5.3 we perform a more detailed analysis of the relationship between remittance behavior and the gender composition of the household.
Households with at least one married member send 60 to 76 percent more remittances abroad, all else equal, relative to households with no married members. There is no remittance effect of adding additional married members to the household.
The inclusion of the household age distribution variables allows us to account for important life-cycle effects within the household. Coefficients can be interpreted in multiple ways.
As reported, the 0.250 coefficient on youths in Column 1 is positive and significant. It indicates that remittances will increase by 25 percent, holding household size constant, if a one person increase in young household members is offset by an equal decrease in members older than 65. An alternative interpretation might instead focus on relative values. For example, this youth coefficient will be 0.288 larger than the one on 18-24 year olds regardless of which of the other groups serves as the reference. This focus on relativity is interesting for noting that, ordinally, the coefficient on youth has the largest and most positive relationship with remittances in all four specifications in Table 4 . The coefficient on members age 46-65 are always the most negative. The statistical significance (or lack-thereof) of these variables is an artifact of the chosen reference group.
The models in Table 4 allow adult household members to fall into one of six mutuallyexclusive work status groupings: military; enrolled in school and employed; enrolled in school and not employed; employed (but not in school); unemployed (but not in school); and idle (i.e., those not working, searching for employment, or enrolled in school). Since these six groups when added to the number of youths variable described above also sum to household size, we again need to omit one to serve as a reference. The results in Table 4 use idle adults as the reference.
The regressions reveal that the number of labor force participants in the household is a significant push factor for monetary transfers abroad. Holding household size constant, an additional employed adult in the household is equivalent to having one fewer idle adult and results in a roughly 50 percent increase in the remittance amount. With additional working members, the household can more easily manage fluctuations in income to cover local expenses and is therefore more likely to send remittances. A similar behavior appears for unemployed adults who are actively searching for employment at the time of the survey.
The positive and significant coefficient on this variable implies that a household with an additional unemployed worker remits 30 percent more than one with an additional idle adult, ceteris paribus.
Per capita income in the state of residence of the household is not a robust predictor of remittances when it is included in the regression (columns 1 and 3). A one percent increase in state income raises remittance levels by 0.52 to 0.57 percent -insignificant estimates that are nonetheless larger in magnitude than the elasticity of household earnings. The lack of significance leads us to believe that household earnings is a more reliable predictor of remittances than local income is.
Pull Factors
Our specification includes two broad factors that might pull remittances from U.S. immigrant households. The first set pertains to household structure: Recall that 6.2 percent of households in our sample report having at least one spouse that lives outside of the household. 12 We suspect that a household with one or more spouses residing in another location might remit more. We explore this by including a dichotomous variable measuring whether anyone in the household has a spouse living elsewhere, plus a second variable measuring the number of household members with a spouse living in another home. Although Sana (2005) finds that Mexican migrants with the partner living in the home community remit at higher levels and rates than those with partners living in the U.S., our baseline specifications do not find a significant remittance effect from either of our variables capturing the existence of spouses outside the home.
The average per capita GDP in the foreign-born household members' birth countries is another possible pull factor for remittances originating in the U.S. As discussed above, the empirical literature has developed conflicting conclusions on this issue. Buch and Kuckulenz (2009) find that households with members from wealthier countries remit significantly less than those with members from poorer countries. This is consistent with altruism and consumption smoothing motives: Migrants may be more inclined to send remittances when their home countries are suffering from permanently or temporarily low income levels. This Buch and Kuckulenz (2009) . We find that households with members from wealthier countries remit significantly less than those with members from poor countries: A one percent increase in average per capita GDP in the birth country is associated with a 0.76-0.84 percent decrease in remittances (columns 1 and 3).
Distance and Geographic Factors
We next consider a set of distance variables capturing the degree of a household's assimilation into the U.S. in addition to typical gravity controls such as physical distance between birth about other family members in the home country so we have to focus on household members in the U.S. countries and the U.S. state of residence, as well as border dummies for Canada and Mexico.
While all households in our sample have at least one foreign-born member, there is tremendous variation in the number, birthplace, and presumed legal status of household members across observations. Recall, for example, that more than 40 percent of households in our sample have at least one member that is likely undocumented and more than 65 percent have at least one native-born member. To examine these factors, we include indicator variables measuring whether any household member is native-born or likely-undocumented, as well as the number of members falling into each group. We find that the presence of native-born members is insignificantly related to remittance levels while an increase in the number of native-born household members is somewhat negatively related to remittances, but this effect is at most only marginally significant. Conversely, we find that households with undocumented migrants remit between 43 and 49 percent more than households who do not have any undocumented migrants. This is consistent with Sana (2005) and Fairchild and Simpson (2008) and is robust across all specifications. Households with undocumented migrants are more likely to stay connected to families in their home country since their likelihood of returning home is high. The number of likely undocumented household members, however, is insignificantly related to remittances.
We also control for the number of foreign-born individuals in the household by entry cohort measured in five-year groupings. These cohort values, when added to the number of native-born household members, sum to equal household size. 13 In general, we do not find statistically significant point estimates for different entry cohorts of immigrants within households. However, the relative magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the amount of time spent in the U.S. is likely to be negatively related to remittance amounts, aligning with results in Sana (2005) and Fairchild and Simpson (2008) . Migrants with less U.S. experience tend to be more connected to their home country and remit more; coefficient point estimates for the number of household members that first entered the U.S. in the previous five years are larger than those for the number of members who first entered more than 5 years ago.
The point estimates for the number of members who first immigrated more than 25 years ago are negative (but still insignificant).
It is common for gravity models to use border indicators and geographic distance as proxies for remittance costs (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Frankel, 2011; McCracken et al., 2017) . We find that remittance amounts are more than 50 percent higher for households who have at least one member who was born in Mexico. We find no significant effect for Canadian household members. The physical distance elasticity is negative and significant, indicating that a higher cost of remitting reduces remittances flows. Not surprising, this variable is insignificant when accounting for state and country fixed effects (in columns 2 and 4). We add two notes of caution about our estimates, however. First, distance in our case measures the average distance between the household's state and the origin countries of its foreignborn members since regressions exploit variation across households, not individuals. Second, we will see in the next section that physical distance as a proxy for remittance cost serves to influence the dichotomous remittance decision, but not the remittance level.
Selection results
Section 3 noted a concern about possible selection bias since roughly 70 percent of our sample of households do not remit. To examine this issue, we consider both a two-part model and a Heckman selection model. The results are reported in Table 5 . Column 1 represents the first stage of the two-part model: A Probit estimation of whether households remit with coefficients representing the marginal probability effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. Column 2 displays the second stage of the two-part model with the natural log of remittance levels as the dependent variable. Column 3 reports the second stage Heckman-corrected coefficients. As before, standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Note that the Heckman model requires that at least one explanatory variable used in the selection regression must be excluded from the second-stage regression of the remittance amount. Results from the two-step estimation in columns (1) and (2) provide guidance for choosing such a variable. There are several variables that are significant determinants of the dichotomous remittance decision but not the truncated log-amount. However, some of these variables (e.g., the indicator variable for the presence of a married household member) are linked to other variables in the model (e.g., the number of married people in the household), so we wish to retain them in all of our regressions. The physical distance variable is a notable exception in that it does not have a strong conceptual link to other explanatory variables.
More critically, a ten percent increase in distance reduces the remittance probability by a highly-significant 4.7 percentage points, but it is not statistically related to the remittance amount. Thus, we choose to omit distance from the second-stage of our Heckman selection model.
The most important results of Table 5 pertain to household earnings. Earnings continue to be a positive and significant predictor of household remittances in these alternative methodologies but with lower elasticity estimates (in columns 2 and 3) than before. Values range between 0.155 in the two-part model and 0.220 in the Heckman model compared to estimates between 0.272 and 0.314 in the baseline models. Qualitative results are therefore robust across specifications.
Other interesting findings also emerge. First, whether a household has a married member or not matters more for the remittance decision (i.e., whether or not to remit) but not for the amount remitted. Similarly, the number of employed and unemployed household members (relative to idle members) are important positive predictors of the probability of remitting but not for remittance levels. This suggests that increasing the number of household members in the workforce provides households the flexibility to remit, which could be motivated by insurance and precautionary saving mechanisms.
Conversely, we find that a few variables -such as the number of household members with a spouse elsewhere and whether the household has any native born members -affect how much households remit but not the probability of remitting. Altruism may be at play here: having a spouse elsewhere may motivate more remittances, while having native-born members reduces the connection to families back home, resulting in fewer remittances.
Gender results
It is somewhat rare in the immigration literature to have a representative sample of women large enough to fully analyze gender and remittance behavior. One advantage of our dataset is that there is an average of over one adult woman and 0.62 employed foreign-born women in each household. Our specifications above finds that the presence of more female household members reduces remittance amounts. In this section, we further explore the interplay between gender composition and remittance behavior with a particular focus on the household earnings elasticity of remittances.
First, we recognize that our single variable measuring the number of female household members used in our baseline and selection models above takes a somewhat limited view of how gender composition might affect remittances. Thus, we replace this variable with an extensive set of indicator variables that control for the number of men and women, male and female employees, male and female children, and male and female adults in the household.
The limitation of this alternative is that these controls are collinear with other variables in the model, thus making interpretation quite cumbersome. Fortunately, our key coefficient of interest -the earnings elasticity -remains straightforward to interpret. Estimates from models analogous to those in Table 4 are comparable to baseline results, ranging from 0.272 to 0.323. 14 Second, and more interestingly, we allow the earnings elasticity estimate to vary by the number of adult men and women in the household. Figure 1 presents the point estimates from a regression using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation as the dependent variable and without country and state indicator variables (a model similar to column 3 of Table 4 ).
Coefficients significant at the five percent level are marked by an 'X'.
Several new insights emerge from this exercise. First, we find that the responsiveness of remittances to earnings grows as the number of adult women in the household increases: the earnings elasticity of remittances is higher in households with more adult women holding the number of adult men constant. In a household with one man, the earnings elasticity ranges from an insignificant -0.06 in a household with no women, to 0.35 with one woman, and 0.69 with two or more women in the household. The same pattern in coefficients exists in households with no men and in households with two or more men.
Second, elasticities are insensitive to whether the household includes 0 or 1 adult man. In Figure 1 , notice that in a household with one woman, the elasticity (0.35) remains practically unchanged in households with 0 or 1 man. However, elasticities fall in households with 2 or more men. The same holds true within households of 2 or more women (but with an elasticity near 0.70). This simple analysis suggests that the gender composition of adults in the household generates interesting differences in the responsiveness of remittances to changes in household earnings. Figure 2 provides further insight. This graph displays the same elasticity results on the vertical axis but with the horizontal axis instead representing the (approximate) difference between the number of women and men in the household. Notice that the elasticity is highest in households with a disproportionate number of adult women. 15 It is interesting to compare and contrast this result with the coefficients on number of female household members in Tables 4 and 5 . Those regressions consistently found that an increase in the number of female household members was associated with reduced remittances. However, we now see a more complex relationship such that remittances are more responsive to income in households with a disproportionate number of women. We speculate that this could be related to differences in migration motives and decision-making that vary across household structure, including the possibility that men are more inclined to remit a fixed amount, whereas women have a higher propensity to remit more as incomes rise. Household structure and decision-making might also be affected by the number of dependents residing in the home country. Unfortunately, the CPS dataset does not record information about family members abroad, nor does it provide individual-level data on remittance decisions. Such information would improve the understanding of the interplay between gender, family and household dynamics, and remittance behavior.
Not apparent in these models is the variation in the number of households in each grouping. More than half of the sample (54 percent) consists of one man and one woman. About 3 percent of households have two or more men but no women, and an equal percentage has two or more women but no men. Overall, however, our results suggest that the earnings elasticity of remittances varies for households with different gender compositions: remittances from households with a relatively large number of women relative to men tend to be more responsive to changes in household income. This result has not been documented in the literature to our knowledge.
Conclusion
This paper is the first to use the 2008 CPS Migration supplement to analyze various factors that affect remittance flows for a cross-section of U.S. households. In our sample, remittances originating in the U.S. are sent to 141 different source countries. We employ a gravity model to consider how various push, pull, and distance factors affect the flow of monetary transfers abroad while controlling for observed differences in households and macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and abroad.
Our findings indicate that various push mechanisms are at play. We find a positive and robust estimate for the earnings elasticity of remittances, indicating that a one percent increase in household earnings corresponds to a 0.20-0.30 percent increase in remittances. This is a sizable effect in the range of estimates that others have found in the literature using different samples of immigrants. Importantly, our analysis highlights differences in this elasticity across household structure. Although remittances are lower among households with more women, ceteris paribus, the responsiveness of remittance outflows to household earnings is higher for households with a disproportionate number of adult women. Very few studies to date have been able to analyze the remittance behavior of immigrant women (mostly due to data limitations), so we hope that our results can be informative for policies that may impact female immigrants differently from male immigrants.
We also identify other push and pull factors affecting remittances. For example, poorer countries (as measured by per capita GDP) attract more remittances from migrant households in the U.S. than relatively rich countries. This supports the notion that remittances are used to help households smooth consumption by sending workers abroad. In addition, the negative relationship between source country GDP and remittance levels also supports the altruistic motive -altruistic households send remittances to destinations where they are more desperately needed. Household characteristics matter as well, consistent with what others have found in the literature. Remittances are lower for more educated households, households with more female members, and households with at least one married person.
In addition, households with more undocumented migrants and fewer native-born members send more remittances. Finally, geography is important such that remittances decrease as the distance birth countries and the U.S. state of residence increases.
We address the potential selection bias that may arise with remittance decisions that result in many observed remittance values equal to zero. Two-part and Heckman models lead to a somewhat reduced magnitude of our estimated earnings elasticity of remittances, but the qualitative results remain unchanged.
While our earnings elasticity estimate pertains to the U.S., it is possible that similar mechanisms are at play in other developed countries -such as Canada or Australia. Our results may therefore be of value to global policymakers interested in better-understanding the determinants of remittance flows. Our analysis suggests that push, pull, and distance variables all affect remittances, as does the composition of households. More research on flows originating in other developed countries would add valuable insight into the generalizability of our results. 
